N.J. firm puts emphasis on weeding out counterfeit electronics components

December 20. 2011 1:28PM

N.J. firm puts emphasis on weeding out counterfeit electronics components

Counterfeit electronic components can be costly, and potentially deadly, when they are integrated into computers and products for the military, government and private industry, according to a Fair Lawn manufacturer.

U.S. Technologies designs, repairs, refurbishes and sometimes builds the small assemblies of electrical parts within larger systems, such as radar or nuclear systems. Spokesman Richard Berk said the company has enlisted a three-part counterfeit component avoidance procedure to protect itself and its clients, both public and private, from malicious hardware.

"That is a very large part of our business, in terms of making sure we're on top of the very serious situation that's going on," Berk said, calling the level of counterfeit components in military and government supply chains "epidemic."

A case study issued by NASA and the W. David Beverly Receiving Inspection Test Facility in Nov. 2010 indicated NASA has been discovering counterfeit components since 1995. The study produced three cases where fraudulent parts were discovered in space flight power supplies, space shuttle pyrotechnic actuators and other pieces of critical hardware.

"Counterfeit parts which enter field service are at risk for latent failures, which could result in loss of systems, vehicles, personnel or mission objectives," the report said.

"Sometimes it's very hard to determine just by looking at a part that it is a counterfeit part," Berk said, adding that UST's first step in preventing counterfeit components in its products is to try to source as many parts as possible from original manufacturers. When that is not possible, the company looks to well-known secondary market suppliers, and as a last resort, UST will go to brokers to buy parts.

Berk said UST's quality team first does an external inspection of parts, looking for well-known counterfeit identifiers, like tool markings, information removal, misspelled words, altered company logos and mismatched identification numbers.

The second step is a functional test to ensure the part operates in the product as it is intended, which Berk said has thoroughness unique to UST. The functionality is compared to baselines either set by government standards or staff engineer parameters.

The final step is to send a small percentage of parts to a third party to do destructive testing, where components are X-rayed, taken apart and authenticated under a microscope.

If a component is determined to be suspicious at any point in the process, in addition to the batch being thrown out, UST will contact the original component manufacturer, along with watchdog groups and agencies.